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Is New Zealand One Market or Many?




• We describe a key feature of the NZEM,
– its effect on the potential for market power abuses, and
– its effect on the behaviour of prices.
• We use factor analysis to
– identify the number of markets in the NZEM, and to
– identify the location of each of these markets.
• We analyze a hedging problem faced by generators.
– What is the best way to sell electricity?
– What does this tell us about the performance of the NZEM?
The NZEM is a pool market
• A stylized description:
– Electricity enters and exits the “pool” at 480 different nodes.
– Given consumers’ demand, the network administrator selects the
combination of generators which minimizes the total cost of
electricity.
• Anything which restricts the administrator’s choice raises
(at least, does not lower) the total cost of electricity.
– transmission constraints
– transmission losses
Competition in a pool market
• In a single integrated pool market,
– each generator competes with every other generator in the pool.
• If the NZEM is segmented,
– some generators face reduced competition.
• Example:
– Suppose a North Island generator withholds supply.
– The market administrator can choose from all other NZ
generators if the market is integrated.
– The market administrator may not be able to choose an
alternative supplier if the generator is protected by a
transmission constraint.
Prices in a pool market
• If the NZEM is a single integrated pool market,
– There is one price across the entire NZEM.
• If the NZEM is segmented,
– There will be different prices for the different component markets
of the NZEM.
• Example:
– Consider a positive shock to demand in the North Island.
– Prices at all nodes increase if the market is integrated.
– Only prices at North Island nodes increase if the Cook Strait
cable is out.
• Prices reveal information about the integration of a pool
market.
Factor Analysis
• We observe prices at 244 nodes in the NZEM:
– PA, PB, PC, and so on




– Hydro inflows, and so on. 
• Factors determine prices.
– If two factors suffice, then
• PA = _A,0 + _A,1 F1 + _A,2 F2 + noiseA
• PB = _B,0 + _B,1 F1 + _B,2 F2 + noiseB
• PC = _C,0 + _C,1 F1 + _C,2 F2 + noiseC
and so on.
How do we use factor analysis?
• To implement factor analysis, we need to know the correlation
structure of the prices at different nodes.
• Factor analysis can reveal
– how many factors drive prices,
– how each factor affects each price, and
– how each factor behaves over time.
• Factor analysis cannot tell us exactly what the factors are.
How do we use factor analysis?
• We use factor analysis to investigate the factor structure of
each trading period’s prices at the following nodes:
How many factors are there?
• We analyze each _-hour trading period separately.
• In each trading period, the first factor explains at least 90% (and








































































































• The second factor raises this to 98% explained.
• This suggests there are no more than two distinct markets in the
NZEM, even in the peak periods.
Filtering out the first factor
• But this could be misleading.
– There are obvious cycles in prices.
– A temperature factor could affect prices in different markets.
• That is, one factor could explain a large percentage of the
variation in prices even if there are two markets.
• Our response is to filter out the first factor’s influence on prices.
Filtered prices are:
P*A  = PA –  _A,0  – _A,1 F1  =  _A,2 F2 + noiseA
P*B  = PB –  _B,0 – _B,1 F1  =  _B,2 F2 + noiseB
P*C  = PC –  _C,0 – _C,1 F1  =  _C,2 F2 + noiseC
and so on.
• The new prices are essentially deviations from a market-wide
index of prices.
How do price deviations behave?
• If there is one market,
– prices will deviate randomly from the market-wide index
– and there will be no common factor to price deviations.
• If there are two markets,
– price deviations in one market will have positive signs,
– price deviations in the other market will have negative signs,
and
– a single factor should explain most of the variation in price
deviations.
How do price deviations behave?
• In each trading period, one factor explains approximately 60%
or more of the variation in price deviations.
• This suggests there are two distinct markets in the NZEM, even












So where are these markets?
• Recall the relationship between prices and factors:
P*A  = PA – _A,0 – _A,1 F1  =  _A,2 F2 + noiseA
P*B  = PB – _B,0 – _B,1 F1  =  _B,2 F2 + noiseB
P*C  = PC – _C,0 – _C,1 F1  =  _C,2 F2 + noiseC
• If nodes A and B are in the same market, the signs of
_A,2 and _B,2 will be the same.  If node C is in the
other market, the sign of _C,2 will be opposite.
So where are these markets?
• Our estimated coefficients:
• Our conclusions:
– The market splits North-to-South.











But are they economically significant?
• Recall the relationship between prices and factors:
P*A  = PA – _A,0 – _A,1 F1  =  _A,2 F2 + noiseA
• We decompose the price at node A into two
components:
• _A,0 + _A,1 F1  is the part of the price which is explained by the
first factor.
• P*A  is the part which is not explained by the first factor.
• The following graphs plot these components for
Benmore prices in peak and off-peak periods.
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What can we say about the number of
markets in the NZEM?
• There seem to be at most two separate markets.
• The NZEM splits along north-south lines.
• The position of the split varies with the time of day.
Risk-management and the NZEM
• Generating and selling electricity is inherently risky.
• We use a simple model of decision-making under
uncertainty to analyze the risks generators face.
– We identify risks which the NZEM structure imposes on
generators.
– We show how these risks can be managed.
– We use optimal risk-management policies to study the extent
of market integration in the NZEM.





Strategy 1 Generator sells 1MW atNode A and receives pA
Strategy 2 Generator “sells” 1MW toretailer at Node B for f
R c ives pA from selling
1MW at Node A
Generator “buys” 1MW at
Node B for pB
In total the generator
receives pA-pB+f
Strategy 3 Some combination ofStrategies 1 (1 - l) and 2 (l).
Identifying the sources of risk
• The generator’s net revenue equals
X = (1-l)pA + l(f + pA - pB)
• There are two sources of risk.
– Base price risk: (1- l) pA
– Transmission price risk: l(f + pA - pB)
• The generator will choose
– l close to 0 if base price risk is relatively low, and
– l close to 1 if transmission price risk is relatively low.




































































What does this analysis tell us?
• The optimal risk-management policy varies over the course of the
day.
• Generators should sell a large proportion (75%+) of their electricity
using fixed price contracts.
• Transmission price risk increases by more than base price risk
during peak periods.
• The high values of l* indicate that transmission price risk is
relatively low in the NZEM.  That is, the market is reasonably
integrated.
                
                  
                  
 
                
                  
                  
 
